Main The Strategy of Social Choice

The Strategy of Social Choice

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Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 18: The Strategy of Social Choice focuses on the social, economics, and political implications of social choice. The publication first surveys introduction, social choice functions and correspondences, and monotonicity and the arrow theorem. Discussions focus on efficiency, anonymity and neutrality, classifying voting methods, normative versus positive approach to voting, voting and the non-strategic theory of social choice, and development of the strategic theory of voting. The text then ponders on strategy-proofness and monotonicity and sophisticated voting. Topics include sophisticated implementation, voting by binary choices, strategy-proof social choice functions and game forms, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and restricted domains. The manuscript examines cooperative voting and voting by veto, including the minority principle, proportional veto core, voting by integer veto, effectivity functions, maximal and stable effectivity functions, and implementation by Nash equilibrium. The text is a dependable source of data for researchers interested in the process of social choice.
Request Code : ZLIBIO1375436
Categories:
Year:
1983
Publisher:
Elsevier Science Ltd
Language:
English
Pages:
226
ISBN 10:
0444863710
ISBN 13:
9780444863713
ISBN:
0444863710,9780444863713
Series:
Advanced Textbooks in Economics

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