Main The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action

The Bounds of Freedom: Kant’s Causal Theory of Action

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Greenberg tackles one of Kant’s most difficult ideas: that we can be the cause of our actions only if the act of our will is free of everything that makes up who we are as individuals. This entails that our free will does not exist in the same time that includes our individuality. The key is an analysis of Kant’s concept of an action, which includes the will as the cause of the action; so included, the causal connection is àtemporal.
Request Code : ZLIBIO1568358
Categories:
Year:
2016
Publisher:
Walter de Gruyter
Language:
English
Pages:
XXII+124
ISBN 10:
3110494663
ISBN:
3110494663, 9783110494662
Series:
Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte 191

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