Main The Dictator's Dilemma At The Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, And Political Order In Autocracies

The Dictator's Dilemma At The Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, And Political Order In Autocracies

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Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Request Code : ZLIBIO3334161
Categories:
Year:
2022
Edition:
1
Publisher:
University Of Michigan Press
Language:
English
Pages:
367
ISBN 10:
047290275X
ISBN 13:
9780472902750
ISBN:
0472075314,9780472075317,0472055313,9780472055319,047290275X,9780472902750
Series:
Weiser Center For Emerging Democracies

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